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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

EMIL J. JACOBSON et ux.,

. Plaintiffs and Respondents,

Case No. 8050

vs.
GEORGE W. SWAN et ux.,
Defendants and Appellants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants are, by this appeal, .asking the Court to construe two so-called leases with options to re-purchase, executed
subsequent to a uniform real estate contract for the purchase
of a home and lot, and incorporating in them that contract,
as in fact extensions and modifications of the original contract,
and upon such construction, to relieve the appellants, purchasers under that contract as modified, from a forfeiture
thereunder.
3
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In June, 1947, the property involved in this case was listed
by its then owner, P. K. Neilson, with the Dixon Real Estate
Co1npany of Provo, Utah, for sale (R. 94). The respondent
l~n1il J. Jacobson, who was at that time a salesman for the
real estate company, showed it to appellants for the purpose
of selling it to them (R. 94, Jacobson's Deposition 2). After
some negotiation, the sale was consummated on June 27, 1947,
in the following manner. The total sale price was $14,000.00.
The appellants paid P. K. Neilson $4,000.00, and the respondents gave him $10,000.00. P. K. Neilson then gaye the
respondents, Jacobsons, a warranty deed, with them as grantees, and the J acobsons in turn executed the usual uniform
real estate contract as vendors, reciting the total purchase price
of~$14,000.00, acknowledging receipt of the $4,000.00 as down
payment, and providing for monthly payments on principal and
interest of $80.00 per month (R. 94-5, Swan's Deposition
2-4, Jacobson's Deposition 1-13). The contract contained the
usual provisions that the vendees, appellants, pay insurance,
taxes, assessments and the like. It also contained, among other
things, the usual forfeiture. clause, examined by this Court in
Perks v. Spencer (1952) ____ Utah ____ , 243 P. 2d 466 (R. 13,
Ps' Ex. F).
By March, 1949, appellants had become in arrears in payments. The amount was disputed, but jury found that appellants had at that time paid a total of $5,060.00 toward principal
and interest (R. 63). Had they kept such payments cu~rent,
they would at that time have paid toward principal and interest the surn~ of $5,520.00. The jury found further that
appellants had paid nothing toward taxes and assessments,
4
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insurance premiu:ms, or attorney's fees (R. 63,). On March 11,
1949, appellants were served with a notice to quit the premises (Ds' Ex. 4, R. 95). It is here noted that this notice was
not in the alternative, as required by Utah law. Pacific Developnzent Co. t'. Stetvart (1948) 113 Utah 403, 195 P. 2d 748.
T~ereafter,

some time in April, 1949, a so:.called lease
was drawn up by Mr. Clyde D. Sandgren as attorney for the .
respondents, and executed by them and the appellants (R.
95-6, Ps' Ex. G).
This document recited the execution of the uniform real
estate contract of June 27; 1947, and incorporated that contract
in it. It then recited the default in payments, that the appellants were tenants at will, but that the respondents were willing.
to lease the premises in question on the terms in that agreement.
It then provided that the respondents lease the premises to the
appellants '((on a month-to-month basis for a period· commencing May 1, 1949, ·and ending no later than April 30, 1950,"
· fo~ a rental of $100.00 per month. Of this sum, $80.00 was to
be credited as rental and $20.00 was to be credited to the
amount delinquent under the uniform real estate contract.
The lessees (appellants) were to pay all taxes, assessments, insurance premiums, etc., during the period of the so-called lease.
Then came a most interesting provision:
In the event that the Lessees shall pay the amounts
specified in the foregoing paragraph at the times they
are due, respectively, the Lessors hereby agree that they
will enter into a new real estate sales contract with
the Lessees in similar form to the one attached, which

5
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new contract will recite a purchase price of $14,000.00
and give credit for all amounts already paid on the
principal, including those paid under the original con-

as well as payments to be made under this agree1Jient. (Emphasis added.)

lrttct

T'he so-called lease further recited that it was made to afford
the appellants a reasonable opportunity to reinstate their right
to purchase the property, but to save to the lessors the right
to remove them as tenants a will in the event they did not
abide by its terms. It further provided that costs of enforcement would be borne by. the party at fault, and that the agreement should bind the heirs, executors, administrators and
assigns of the parties.
By April, 1950, appellants were in arrears on payments
under this first lease agreement in the amount of $287.41
(R. 81, 96). This sum was paid to respondents by appellants ·
(R. 81), and the first lease agreement expired by its own terms
April 30, 1950. The jury found that under that first lease agreement the appellants had paid to the respondents $1,440.00
toward principal and interest, $109.41 taxes, $78.00 as premium on a three-year insurance policy, and $100.00 to Clyde
D. Sandgren as attorney's fees. All sums required to· be paid
by appellants under this first lease agreement were in fact
paid (R. 81).
The respondents' attorney, Clyde D. Sandgren, then
drafted another so-called lease agreement, herein denominated
the second lease agreement, executed by the parties on June
27, 1950 (R. 81, Jacobson's Deposition 14, 16-17, 21, Swan's
Deposition 16).
6
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In general plan this second lease agreement was much
like the first. It referred to the uniform real estate contract
of June 27, 1947, and incorporated that contract in it. It recited the defaults and the fact of the first lease agreement.
Respondents then leased the premises to appellants ((on a
month-to-month basis for a period commencing September 1,
1950, and ending May 31, 1953." Appellants were to pay
therefor $100.00 per month for the three year period, and
were to pay all insurance premiums, taxes, assessments, etc.,
during that time.
The document then provided that, m the event the appellants performed all the conditions therein contained, a new
real estate contract would be entered into, with respondents
as vendors and appellants as purchasers, reciting a purchase
price of $14,000.00, and giving appellants credit for all sums .
paid under the real estate contract of June 27, 1947, the first
lease agreement of April ____ , 1949, and the second lease agree~
ment of June 27, 1950.
This second lease agreement contained one additional
provision not in the first. It stated that if the rent were not paid
as therein provided, then the lessors (respondents) could reenter, re-let the premises, nand apply the net proceeds so received upon the amount due under this lease." If we were to
concede that this document was a lease, this would certainly
make it look like a term tenancy. This, we believe, is important
because of the kind of notice to quit given the appellants.
By March, 1952, appellants were in arrears under this
second lease agreement (R. 21, Swan's Deposition 7). The jury
found that, to that time they had made payment to the re-
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sponddents tot~ling $1,900.00 (R. 63). The jury credited this
to "principal and interest" because that was the phraseology
of the interrogatory, but if the appellants were in fact tenants,
it would appear this should have been (trent." They found that
nothing had been paid toward taxes and assessments, insur~
ance premiums, or attorney's fees.
On March 5, 1952, there was served upon appellants a
further notice to quit (R. 52, Ds' Ex. 5). This notice was to.
quit mere Iy, without alternative. Although the appellants
pleaded that a tender of sums due at that time was made at
once, and this fact was in issue, the trial court refused. to submit
this question to the jury, and refused to allow testimony thereon
(R. 89-90).
Of course, nothing further was paid, a further notice to
quit was served upon appellants on August 12, 1952, again
not in the alternative, and this action was commenced November 8, 1952. ·
The complaint was brought in unlawful detainer, to quiet
title in the respondents, to restore the land to them, for the
unpaid amounts under the second lease agreement, for damages,
and for attorney's fees (R. 11).
.
Defendants, in their answer, after admitting and denying
the allegations of the complaint, set up alternative affirmative
defenses. The first defense was that the warranty deed from
P. K. Neilson to respondents and the real estate contract between respondents and appellants, both executed June 27, 1947,
were in fact a mortgage (R. 23). The defendants further pleadS
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ed tender of the sums due under the various agreements after
receipt of the notice to quit served March 5, 1952 (Ds' Ex. 5)
and also such tender after receipt of the notice to quit served
August 12, 1952 (R. 22-23). Defendants further pleaded in
the alternative that the first and second lease agreements were
in truth and fact extensions and modifications of the original
real estate contract, that strict performance of the terms and
conditions of the original contract were waived, that defendants had substantially performed thereunder and were therefore
not in default, were entitled to continue with the contract, and
were entitled to attorney's fees (R. 23-24). They further
pleaded that if respondents, under the several contracts, had
the right to repo~sess the property, then under the rule of
Perkins v. Spencer, supra, they were entitled to relief from
forfeiture and that the notice to quit of _August 12, 1952,
under which the unlawful detainer action was brought, did not
comply with law (R. 24).
.

.

Appellants thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment under the mortgage theory set forth above and respond~nts _
filed a counter-motion for summary judgment, to strike the
answer, and for a general judgment (R-. 26-27). The trial
court, in a memorandum decision, denied the appellants' motion for summary judgment under the mortgage theory (R .
. 28-50). Though this was urged as error at the commencement
of appeal, the appellants abandon this theory and we shall
discuss it no further. The trial court also construed the uniform ·real estate contract and the first and second lease agreements as separate and independent contracts, stating th?-t the
·uniform real estate contract was incorporated into the first

9
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and second lease agreements for two purposes only:
(a) The fixing of the terms of the new Uniform
~eal Estate Contract, conditionally agreed to be entered
tnto, and
(b) To determine the extent and nature of accumulations to the obligations of the defendants in order
that the promised new Uniform Real Estate Contract
and the interim conditional agreements may assure the ·
respective parties receipt by each of their respective
entitlements under the original arrangement, despite
confessed violations· (R. 42).
The court then held that the appellants were, under the second
lease agreement, tenants at will, that the notice to quit of August 12, 1952 (Ps' Ex. I) was adequate under· the statute,
though not in the alternative. The memorandum decision does
not discuss or mention the notice to quit of March 5, 1952,
also not in the alternative, nor does it discuss or mention the
tender of payments due made immediately thereafter by appellants. Presumptively, the court felt this unimportant in view
of its position that appellants were tenants at will of respondents under the second lease agreement. The court then
ordered that the respondents have judgment against appellants
for immediate restitution of the premises, but. restrained them
from selling or encumbering the same until :final disposition
of the cause, unless a bond was :filed to secure payment of any
sums ultimately determined to be due appellants. It ordered
that respondents prepare findings, conclusions, judgment, and
a writ for possession, conditioned on the .bond being :filed
. (R. 49). The bond was never :filed, and no. papers as described
above were filed.
The trial court reserved the following issues of fact for
1(
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determination by the jury:
1. What is the total amount of defendants' payments
toward the purchase of the property under Exhibits
UA," HB," and UC" [the uniform real estate contract,
and the first and second lease agreements ?

J

2. What is the reasonable value of permanent improvements, if any, placed upon the premises during
their possession ?

3. What is the reasonable value of damages, if any,
caused to the premises by the defendants' occupancy?
4. What is the reasonable rental value of the property during all of the time of defendants' occupancy?
5. What further damages have plaintiffs suffered,
if any, by reason of defendants' unlawful detainer?
6. What is a
counsel?

rea~onable

attorney's fee for plaintiff's

The court further reserved as an issue of law the question
whether plaintiffs were entitled to an award of any attorney's
fee.
The case was then tried to a jury on the issues reserved
above. The jury returned a special verdict, finding that appellants had paid, under all three instruments, a total of $8,687.41
on principal and interest, taxes and assessments, insurance
premiums and attorney's fees. It further found that appellants
had caused no damage to the premises during their occupancy,
that the reasonable market value of the property, both on June
27, 1947 and on September 15, 1952, was $14,000.00, that
the reasonable rental value of the premises during the period
of occupancy by appellants was $85.00 per month, and that
a reasonable attorney's fee for respondents in the case was
$500.00 (R. 63-64).
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The trial court then made its analysis of the case (R.
(79-86), awarding appellants a net judgment of $331.30
which it found to be a net penalty, and denying respondents
an attorney's fee on the authority of Forrester v. Cook (1930)
77 Utah 137, 292 Pac. 206. Costs were, of course, awarded to
respondents.
..
The manner in which the trial court arrived at the net
penalty of $331.30 is best illustrated in the conclusions of law
( R. 98-101). The court concluded that the uniform real estate.
contract was mutually terminated by agreement of the parties
under the first lease agreement, and that thereafter, during the
term of the first and of the second lease agreements, and until
September 15, 1952, appellants were tenants at will of re.spondents ( R. 99) . From that date until the trial, it concluded
appellants were guilty of unlawful detainer (R. 99). It then
concluded, under the authority of Perkins v. Spencer, supra,
that the difference between the amount paid from June 27,
1947 to April, 1949, under the uniform real estate contract
($5,060.00) and a reasonable rental at $85.00 per month for
the same period ($1,870.00) was a penalty, unenforceable,
and that appellants were therefore entitled to a gross credit
of $3,190.00 (R. 99) ~
The trial court then granted respondents, as set-off, the
total of all unpaid payments, both toward principal and interest and toward taxes, assess:ffients, and insurance premiums
unpaid uncle~ t~e second lease agreement, with interest on each ·
such payment from due date until April 1, 195 3, this, according to the court, amounting to $1,328.70 (R. 82-83, 99-100).
(It should be noted that delinquent payments under the first
12
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lease agreement were paid up before execution of the second
lease agremnt [R. 71 J). It then granted as furthe~ set-off,
treble the reasonable tental from September 15, 1952, as
damages for unlawful detainer, ·amounting to $1,530.00 (R.
100). These set-offs, when added and the total subtracted from
the gross penalty thus determined, left the net judgment for
appellants of $331.30.
One additional matter bears note. When this action was
commenced, the parties were considerably apart in their view
as to how much had been paid to respondents by appellants
(See Swan's Deposition, pages 11, 17-19, Jacobson's Deposition 24, 26, Ds' Exs. 1, 2). Until after this action was com.menced, respondents claimed that there was $9,600.00 owing
them (Jacobson's Deposition 26-27, Swan's Deposition 11,
17-19), and this, though the jury found the appellants had
already paid $4,687.41 on what amounted to a ·$10,000 loan!
One wonders what the $3,287.41 was paid for. At the trial,
the difference in testimony as to what had been paid was not
so great but this issue still had to be resolved by the jury.
It is appellants' position that the two so-called leases were
in fact modifications of the terms of the original uniform real
estate contract, that on March 5, 1952, when served with the
notice to quit, (Ds' Ex. 5) appellants were still purchasers
under that contract, and respondents wrongfully refused the
tender of sums then delinquent, made by appellants immediately
~pon receipt of that notice to quit. Further, neither this notice
to quit, nor the one served August 12, 1952, upon which th_e
unlawful detainer action was based, was in the alternative,
allowing appellants to pay delinquent payments or v~cate, and

13
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they thus did not comply with law. Pacific Development Co.
I'. Stewart, supra. Respondents, therefore, wrongfully terminated the contract.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OF JUNE.
27, 1947, WAS TERMINATED BY THE SO-CALLED
LEASES OF APRIL, 1949, AND OF JUNE 27,· 1950. THESE
INSTRUMENTS WERE IN TRUTH AND FACT MERELY
EXTENSIONS AND MODIFICATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OF JUNE 27,
1947, THAT CONTRACT WAS NEVER PROPERLY OR
LAWFULLY TERMINATED, AND THE TRIAL COURT
SHOULD HAVE GRANrED THE DEFENDANTS (PURCHASERS) RELIEF FROM A FORFEITURE OF SUMS
PAID THEREUNDER.

POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING ·THAT
ANY OF THE NOTICES TO QUIT SERVED UPON THE
APPELLANTS (PURCHASERS) COMPLIED WITH THE
LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH ON UNLAWFUL DETAINER.
14
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POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT,
AFTER MARCH 5, 1952, APPELLANTS MADE NO TENDER OF SUMS DUE UNDER THE CONTRACTS, IN REFUSING TESTIMONY ON THIS ISSUE, AND IN NOT
SUBMITTING IT TO THE JURY.

POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS WERE, AT THE TIME OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT, STILL DETAINING THE PREMISES UNLAWFULLY, OR DETAINING THEM AT ALL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OF JUNE
27, 1947, WAS TERMINATED BY THE SO-CALLED
LEASES OF APRIL, 1949, AND OF JUNE 27, 1950. THESE
INSTRUMENTS WERE IN TRUTH AND FACT MERELY
EXTENSIONS AND MODIFICATIONS OF THE ORIGINAL UNIFORM REAL ESTATE CONTRACT OF JUNE 27,
1947, THAT CONTRACT WAS NEVER PROPERLY OR
LAWFULLY TERMINATED, AND THE TRIAL COURT
SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE DEFENDANTS (PUR-
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CHASERS) RELIEF FROM A FORFEITURE OF SUMS
PAID THEREUNDER.

We begin our argument by drawing to the court's attention a well established rule of construction of contractsthat they are construed strictly against t~e party who drafts
them. This is particularlf so where the instrument is a lease or
other contract affecting land, and is drafted by counsel for the
landlord. Lori, Limited, Inc., et al. v. Wolfe et al., ( 1948)
192 P. 2d 112, 85 Cal. App. 2d 54; Golden v. Mount, (Wash.
1949) 203 P. 2d 667. Further, where a lease is capable of
more than one construction, it will be construed in favor of ·
the tenant, unless he himself prepares it. Powerine Co. v.
Russell's Inc., et al., ( 1943) 103 Utah 441, 135 P. 2d 906;
Anderson v. Ferguson· et al., (Wash. 1943) 135 P. 2d 302.
It will be noted that the first and the second le~se agreements were drawn by the attorney for respondents, . and were
drawn to meet their approval (Jacobson's Deposition 16-17,
21) . It will be further noted that the trial court, without hesitation, held in its memorandum decision upon respondents'
motion for summary judgment, that the first and second lease .
agreements were clearly and unambiguously separate and distinct contracts, independent of each other and of the original . ·
uniform r:eal estate contract. Refering to the first lease agreement, the court stated:

* * * No language could be clearer as to· the termination as a contract between the parties of Exhibit ·
(A.'' [the uniform real estate contract J * * * It was
a new .agreement which adopted no terms of ~he old,
16.
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is complete and entire in itself and refers to the old
one only for the purpose of :fixi~g the consideration for
the new.
The reasoning need not be reiterated (because it
would vary only in inconsequential detail) in considering Exhibit ~~C." [the second lease agreement] It is
likewise a complete new agreement referring to nA"
(the uniform real estate contract J and nB" [the first
lease agreement J only for the purpose of providing a
contingent right for the defendants to have a new contract o~ purchase (R. 45-46).
The court concluded that the parties by mutual agreement as
evidenced by the first and second lease agreements terminated
the uniform real estate contract, as of April, 1949, and that
the appellants were, from then until September 15, 1952,
tenants at will of the respondents under the first and second
lease agreements (R. 98-99). (We shall revert to this tenantat-will theory later) .
. This leads to a very interesting proposttlon. It will be
remembered that the trial court applied the rule of Perkins
v. Spencer, supra, to the uniform real estate contract, determining that in April, 1949, when the court found ·the real estate
contract was terminated, appellants were entitled. to a gross
refund, as an unenforceable penalty, of $3,190.00. Then,
applying this to all delinquencies, with ·interest, under the
second lease agreement, ·there remained due the appellants
from this penalty sum, on March 28, 195 3, the date of the
trial court's decision on reserve issues, the sum of $331.30. It
will be further recalled that the second lease agreement ended
by its terms on May 31, 1953. If the $331.30 due appellants
at the time of trial were applied to the rent for March, April
17
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and May, 1953, at $100.00 per month, there would remain the
sum of $3,1.30 due appellants, appellants would have performed under the terms of the second lease agreement, and
\vould be entitled to enter into a new real estate contract, similar
to the first, and be credited with all payments theretofore made
t.aul er I he first recti estate ocntract, the first and sec.nnd lease
dgrce1uents! Appellants, then, never were in default under
the second lease agreement, because they were entitled to use
as a set-off sums due them from termination of the uniform
real estate contract dated June 27, 1947, which the court found
\vas ter1uinated by the parties in April, 1949, and which was
incorporated in the two lease agreements only to define the
tenns of the contemplated new real estate contract.
The theory of the respondents is no less interesting.
From their argument in the trial court, and from their third
statement of points to be relied on upon appeal, we take their
position to be this: The Perkins ·v. Spencer rule applies to the
original unnform real estate contract, and a portion of sums
paid in by appellants is in fact a penalty. However, this
amount representing a penalty was given up as consideration
by appellants for respondents' executing the first lease agreement. This is indeed a bargain, as the amount thus paid as
consideration on a one year lease was a mere $3,190.00 plus
$100.00 per month for the term, plus taxes, insurance and
assessments! Another trouble with this theory is that, if appellants performed the first and second lease agreements, then,
by their very terms, this same $3,190.00 was to be credited, with
all other payments, toward payment on a new uniform real
estate contract in the same terms as the old. This might be
18
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denominated the ndouble-or-nothing, theory.
This argument, we believe, merely spotlights the real ·
objective of respondents through the entire transaction-to
avoid, somehow, that rule of law whereby the courts" will not
enforce a provision for liquidated damages when that provision in fact is for a penalty or forfeiture, and when damages
are readily ascertainable.
The trial court concluded that the appellants were, from
April, 1949, to September 15, 1952, tenants at will merely
(R. 46-47, 99). With this conclusion we respectfully differ.
As we conceive it, the nature of an estate
in land is de.
termined by its incidents, and not by what the parties happen
to call it. This Court has certain!y never hesitated to find an
estate to be in · fact other than what it is denominated in a
grant. Duerden v. Solomon} et al.J (1908) 33 Utah 468, 94
Pac. 978; Hess v. AngerJ (1918) 53 Utah 186, 177 Pac. 232;
Corey v. Roberts} ( 1933) 82 Utah 445, 25 P. 2d 940; Brown
v. -SkeenJ ( 1936) 89 Utah 568, 58 P. 2d 24; Bybee v. Stewart}
(1948) 189 P. 2d 118; J\!orthcrestJ Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust
Co.J (1952) 248 P. 2d 692.
.

An estate at will is defined by the American Law Institute·
Restatement of the Law of Pro pertyJ section 21:
An estate at will is an estate which is terminable at
the will of the transferor and also at' the will of the
transferee and which has no other designated period
of duration. (Emphasis added).
The death of either the landlord or the tenant operates as an
19
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automatic termination of such estate. 32 A.J. 83, Landlord &
Tenant § 76. Where a lease is for a fixed term, with an option
in one of the parties, either lessee, or lessor, but not in the other,
to tt rrninate before end of the tenn, the estate is not one at will.

32 A.J. 82, 708, Landlord & Tenant, § 66, 831. Statutes conc<.:rning tenancies at will are held not to be applicable to
leases for definite periods, though terminable if covenants
therein contained were not fulfilled. Andrews v. Russell,
( 1927) 259 Pac. 113, 85 Cal App 149; West Pub. Co. Key
No. Landlord & Tenant 103t{ 1).
In the case before the Court it will be noted that in both
the first and second _lease agreements, "the heirs, executors,
administrators and assigns of the respective parties" are bound
by the terms. The grant in the first lease agreement is ((on a
month-to-month basis for a period commencing May 1, 1949,
and ending no· later than April 30, 1950." In the second lease
agreement the. grant, so far as material to this case, is ((on
a month-to-month basis for a period commencing September
1, 1950, and ending May 31, 1953." The succeeding paragraph
in this second lease agreement refers to the ~ppellants' becoming umonth-to-month tenants commencing September 1, 1950."
This second lease agree·ment contains other provisions bearing on this question. We quote:
And ·the Lessees further. agree to deliver up· said
premises to Lessors at the expiration of said term in as
good order and condition as when the same were entered upon by Lessees, * * *
Lessees further covenant and agree that if said ren~
above reserved, or any part thereof, shall be unpaid
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for 15 days after the same shall becon1e due, or if default be made in any of the covenants herein contained
to be kept by said Lessees, or if Lesses shall vacate such
premises, it shall and may be lawful for Lessors, their
legal representatives or assigns, without notice or legal
process to re-enter and take possession of said premises
and every and any part thereof, and re-let the same
and apply the net proceeds so received upon the amount
due ttnder this lease. (Emphasis added.)
If we were to concede these instruments to be leases, they
most certainly do not create tenancies at will. To be sure,
appellants are denominated therein as tenants at wilL The
estate is also called a nterm" and in each instance a definite
term is fixed. Appellants are also called nmonth-to-month
tenants." We are reminded of the phrase, nyou nam~. it, we
got it." Notwithstanding these conflicts, contradictions, and
ambiguities, the trial court stated that the parties nmust be held
to their clear and explicit contracts," and declared appellants
tenants at will (R. 46-47).
·The common sense of the matter is simply this: The appellants, as they admitted, became in arrears in payments for
their home. They never, it must be stated, admitted the amount
of the arrearage to be that claimed by respondents, at any
time. They were given a summary notice to quit the premises
(Ds' Ex. 4). They immediately called upon respondent Emil
J. Jacobson and his attorney to see if they could not work out
some way of saving their rights in the premises. The first
lease agreement, worked out between Jacobson and his own
atto~,ney was offered as the answer. It should be remembered
appellant George Swan i~ a cook (Swan's Deposition 2),
and Mr. Jacobson is a real estate salesman (Jacobson's Depo-
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sition 4-5). This agreement saved appellants' position for the
n1oment, at least in their minds. The real estate contract of
June 27, 1947, was made a part of this lease agreement. Appellants became in arrears under this document as its terms drew
to a close. Appellants made up these arrearages, but respondents were still apparently not willing to enter into the new
real estate contract provided for in the first lease agreement.
At any rate, the second lease agreement was prepared in the
same manner, and appellants executed it.
In point of legal concept, these lease agreements made
only one material change in the relationship of the parties,
and that was in the amount of the payments to be made by
appellants. The original" contract contained a provision that
time was of the essence, and that the seller could, upon default
of the buyer, constitute the latter a tenant at will. The second
lease agreement, under which the unlawful detainer action
was brought, merely gave the ((lessors" the rrright to remove
the Lessees from possession as tenants at will in the event"
they did not keep up the payments. They had this right under
the original contract. Under all the instruments, appellants
in fact became, upon default, tenants at will of respondents
only upon the election of the latter. We revert to this proposition under our Point II. Again we state, the only difference
in point of law of the. positions of the parties under the lease
agreements and the original contract was in the amounts to
be paid per month. Otherwise, appellants had a right to enter
into a ((new" contract of purchase, exactly like the one of June
27, 1947, and moreover, to be credited with payment thereon
for all sums paid under the so-calle? leases. All other provi22
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sions of the lease agreements,. except for the preliminary
recitals, find their legal counterparts in the original real estate
contract. We respectfully submit that these so-called leases
\\~ere in truth and in fact n1erely modifications of provisions
in the original real estate contract for manner and amount of
payment to be made by appellants in their purchase of the
property, and that at least until March 5, 1952, they were
vendees under that contract.
We have found no Utah cases dealing with precisely this
type of instrument. An interesting device is apparently used
in Kansas, where the owner leases property to .one, with
monthly rent reserved, and with further provisions that the
sale price is a stated amount, and when rental paid equals
that amount, the property shall be conveyed to the ((tenant,"
but if there is a default in the payment of such nrent," sums
theretofore paid shall be forfeited. When substantial amounts
have been paid under such an arrangement, the Kansas court .
treats it is a contract of sale and applies the doctrine of equitable
conversion. See Stevens et al v. McDowell} Judge, ( 1940) 98
P. 2d 410, 151 Kan. 316, and cases therein cited. On March 5,
1952, when the summary notice to quit was served upon appellants and after which payment was refused by respondents,
appellants had paid a total of $8,687.41 toward purchase of
the premises in dispute. We respectfully submit that these socalled leases are, and were intended at the time they were draftd, a device whereby respondents attempted to avoid the rule
of damages as set forth in Perkins v. Spencer} supra, and further, that this device is transparent on its face.
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
AN\r OF THE NOTICES TO QUIT SERVED UPON THE
APPELLANTS (PURCHASERS) COMPLIED WITH THE
LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH ON UNLAWFUL DE.,./\INER.
Though we were to concede that the appellants were
merely tenants of respondents under the second lease agreement, still our position is that such tenancy was wrongfully
terminated on March 5, 1953. If they were held to be mere
tenants, appellants also had, by terms of the lease, an option
to purchase, which option, in view of the sums already paid
to respondents to be credited to such purchase, was most valuable.
The notice to quit of March 5, 1952, was, it will be recalled, summary in form, without alternative. So aJso was the
notice served August 12, 1952 (Ps' Ex I).· These notices could
. suffice only if served on the theory appellants were at the time
tenants at will, under section 78-36-3 subsection (2), Utah
Code Annotated 1953, and of course this is precisely what the
trial court determined appellants to be. We have already, under
Point· I of this brief, discussed this tenant-at-will proposi,tion,
and analyzed the instruments to show th·at, whatever relationship appellants had, it was not that of tenant at will. We shall
develop this argument further, assuming only for the purpose
of argument that appellants were tenants and not purchas-ers.

. The trial court quoted paragraph ( 4) of the second lease
')/o
,..•!
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agreement as the basis for holding appellants to be tenants at
will under that agreement. We quote that paragraph:
It is agreed by and between the parties hereto that
the purpose of this contract is to allow the Lessees a
reasonable opportunity to· reinstate their right to purchase said property but at the same time to preserve the
Lessors' right to remove the Lessees from possession
as tenants at will in the event the latter do not perform
according to the terms of this contract. (Emphasis
added.)
It will be observed that this gives respondents a right to remove appellants for default. It does not provide that default
shall operate as an automatic ~ermination of the estate. Bergman et al v. Lewis, ( 1926) 68 Utah 178, 249 Pac. 470; Hohworth v. Mills,. (1923) 62 Utah 474, 221 Pac. 165. The rest
of this agreement negatives the automatic· termination through
default. Paragraph ( 3) contemplates the execution of a new
real estate contract upon perfo_rmance of the terms of the socalled lease. Paragraph ( 5) provides that the ((lessees" .will
deliver up the premises at the end of the term in good condition, and will not sub-let during the term. Paragraph ( 6) gives
the respondents, upon default by appellants, the right to re- ·
enter, re-let, ((and apply the net proceeds so received upon the ·
amount due ·under this lease." Paragraph ( 8) provides that
the party at fault shall ((pay all costs and expenses that may
. arise from enforcing this agreement,'·' and paragraph (9) provides that the agreement shall be binding on ·((the heirs, executors, administrators and assigns of the respective parties
hereto." When viewed in its entirety, the agreement cannot
be said to make default in payment by appellants operate as
25
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an automatic termination-it simply cannot be said that paragraph ( ·1) is a special limitation on the estate created.
'l'he An1ericc1Jl Law Institute Restatement of the Law of
Property, § 23, defines a special limitation:

1'he term "special limitation" denotes that part of
the language of a conveyance which causes the created
interest automatically to expire upon the occurrence of
a stated event, and thus provides for a terminability
in addition to that normally characteristic of such interest.
Section 24 defines a condition subsequent:
The term ((condition subsequent" denotes that part
of the language of a conveyance, by virtue of which
upon the occurrance of a stated event the conveyor,
or his successor in interest, has the power to terminate
the interest which has been created subject to the condition subsequent, but which will continue until this
power is exercised.
Paragraph b. of the Comment under this latter section states:
Whenever an estate subject to a condition subsequent
is created, some person has the power to terminate this
estate upon the occurrence of the stipulated event.
Thus such an estate does not end automatically and
by expiration as does an estate subject to a special
limitation. On the contrary, it is cut short, or divested,
if, but only if, the person having the power chooses to
exercise it. (Emphasis added.)
Whether a provision in a conveyance is a special limitation or
a condition subsequent is one of interpretation. See Annotation, 118 ALR 283, 292.
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Indeed, the above principles are well established in this
state, the above quotations from the Restatement being merely
declaratory of what this Court has already determined to be
the law. Hohzl'ortb v. Mills, supra; Bergman et al v. Lewis,
Supra; Leone et al. v. Zuniga et al., (1934) 84 Utah 417, 34
P. 2d 699, 94 ALR 123!2. Ambiguous leases are construed in
favor of the tenant, and conditions involving forfeiture must
be strictly interpreted against the party for whose benefit they
are created. Powerine Co. v. Russell's, Inc., et al., and Anderson
v. Ferguson et al., supra. See also West Pub. Co. Key No.
Landlord & Tenant§ 47, 163(1), 108(2).
We respectfully submit the most that can be said for respondents was that paragraph ( 4) of the second lease agreement created a condition subsequent-it gave the respondents a
right to declare a termination of the agreement, but they had
a choice to exercise it or not. They could, under their theory, as
well have re-entered, re-let, and held appellants for the difference thus realized and that due under the contract up to May
31, 195 3. That provision being a condition subsequent, respondents had to exercise their right to declare appellants' term ended
by virtue of the default. This they could do by notice to quit
under section 78-36-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953, but we
further submit that such notice must, under the applicable portion of that statute, subsection ( 3) , or possibly ( 5) , be in
the alternative-to perform or. to vacate.
Of course, we still maintain that, at least until March 5,.
1952, appellants were in fact contract purchasers, as argued
under Point I of this brief. As such, they were of course, en27
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titled to an alternative notice, under the statute cited above;
\vhith notice they were never given. Pacific Development Co.
l'. Stewart, supra.

POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
'
AFTER MARCH 5, 1952, APPELLANTS MADE NO TENDER OF SUMS DUE UNDER THE CONTRACTS, IN REFUSING TESTIMONY ON THIS ISSUE, AND IN NOT
SUR1\1ITTING IT TO THE JURY.
In their answer, appellants plet;tded that, immediately
after receiving the notice to quit of March 5, 1952, they made
a tender of all sums due respondents to that date, but respondents refused to accept such tender (R. 22-23). The trial court,
in its memorandum decision, did not even mention this is.sue,
and, of course, did not reserve it for the jury. At the trial,
~ppellants offered the notice as an exhibit (Ds' Ex. 5). The
appellants then. made a proffer of proof on this issue.
Appellants . had pleaded substantial performance, the
tender of March, 1952, and its refusal, and had prayed for
specific performance of the contract, including their cost and
attorneys' fees under the contract. At the end of the trial appellants moved for leave to amend in order to seek. damages for
wrongful termination of the contract, which motion was denied.
Appellants thus persisted in asserting their· right to perform
under the contract, their attempt so to do, and in asserting the
insufficiency of the notice to quit of March 5, 1952.
28
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It might be argued that the notice of March 5, 1952,
constituted the termination of the contract, and that therefore
the notice to quit of August 12, 1952, under which the unlawfull detainer action was brought, need not be in the alternative.
This completely ignores what, under appellants' theory,
1s a very important matter-appellants were, under section
78-36-3 (3) or (5), Utah Code Annotated 1953 and the law.of
Pacific Development Co. Z'J. Stewart, supra, entitled to an
opportunity to bring their payments current. Appellants maintain that a tender ·of these sums was .made immediately upon
service of the notice of March 5, 1952, but refused by appellants. This is material, both on the question of treble damages
for unlawful detainer, and on the question of wrongful .termination of the contract by respondents.
In view of section 78-21-1, Utah Cade Annotated 1953,
appellants were entitled as a matter. of right to have this question of tender go to the jury, as this is an action for recovery
of specific real property; instead, the trial court kept the issue ·
from the jury, and made a finding thereon without admitting
evidence. This, we respectfully submit, was error. . Valley .
Mortuary v. Fairbanks ( 1950) ---- Utah, 225, Pac. 2d 739.

POINT· IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT APPELLANTS WERE, AT THE TIME OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT, STILL DETAINING THE PREMISES UNLAWFULLY, OR DETAINING THEM AT ALL.
29
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In their answer, appellants asserted substantial performance, and the right to bring p,ayments to date and continue with
the contract of purchase (R. 23·-25). Throughout the entire
u>urse in the trial court, appellants insisted on this right (R.
7(), 85-86). They refused to treat the contract of purchase as
tc nninated.
In its memorandum decision, the trial court granted on
sumn1ary judgment, the right to immediate possession to the
respondents, provided they filed a bond to protect rights that
might be determined to be in appellants (R. 49). No findings,
conclusions, interlocutory decree, writ or bond was, filed in
compliance with this decision.
The trial was concluded, and special verdict entered March
18, 1953 (R. 75). Appellants still pursued their theory, seeking damages for wrongful termination of contract (R. 76). The
final decision of the court was rend~red March 28, 1952 (R.
77), but the respondents did not prepare and submit findings
of fact and conclusions of law until June 9, 195 3 (R. 101, 106).
Appellants finally concluded to yield up possession, moving out on March 23, 195 3, and turning the premises over to
respondents April11, 1953 (R. 104). Their reason for so doing
is quite obvious; it most certainly was not an abandonment of
their theory.
Yet respondents submitted, June 9, 195 3, almost two
months later, findings of fact and conclusions of law, wherein
it was found that the appellants, at that date, were withholding
the premises unlawfully, and the trial court signed these findIngs.
30
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We draw this to the Court's attention because, even under
our theory of the case, respondents are without doubt entitled
to a reasonable rental for the actual period of occupancy by
appellants, but only for such period.

CONCLUSION
Given the propositions that the two so-called leases were
merely modifications of the manner of payment to be made as
provided in the uniform real estate contract, that appellants
were then contract purchasers of the premises in dispute at
least until March 5, 1952, that the notices to quit did not comply with the requirements of section 78-36-3, Utah Code Annotated 195 3, and that the respondents wrongfully terminated
the contract of purchase by refusing the tender of sums due
thereunder made March 5, 1952, one further matter remains
for consideration, and that is t~e issue of damages.
So far as respondents are concerned, we believe the trial
court correctly denied them attorney's fees, under the provisions of the contracts and the case of Forrester v. Cook} supra.
On the authority of that case and Perkins v. Spencer, supra,
we also believe that respondents were not entitled to treble
damages from September 15, 1952, for the reason that the
action wherein that is allowed is statutory, and the notices to
quit did not meet statutory requirements.
But the case before this Court differs from those cases
cited. It is our position that, on March 5, 1952, appellants_were
entitled to bring their payments current, Pacific Development
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Co. t'. Stewart, supra. Furthermore, we assert that appellants
tnade tender at that time to do this, but such tender was refused
by respondents. The record is replete with evidence that even
a ftt-r commencement of this action attempts were made to P?-Y
up on the contract, but these attempts were blocked by resp< >ndents. They simply. would not agree on what amount was
due (See Depositions of George W. Swan and Emil J. Jacobson). 1t is, therefore, our position that the contract was terminated wrongfully by respondents, and appellants are therefore ·
entitled to damages.

In view of the special verdict of the jury in this case, appellants would be entitled, under the rule of Perkins v. Spencer,
supra, to a refund of all sums paid in, less a reasonable rental
for the period of occupancy. In that case, however, the notice
\\·as in the alternative, and the purchasers did not· perform.
The question of damages ·for wrongful termination was not
before the court. In the case of McBride v. Stewart et al.,
( 1926) 68 Utah 12, 249 Pac. 114, 48 ALR 267, this Court
considered the element of damages for wrongful termination
of a real estate contract by the vendor, awarding to the purchaser the amount paid in less a reasonable rental. However,
in that case that sum was all that was sought. In the case of
Dunshee v. Geoghegan ( 1891), 7 Utah 113, 25 Pac. 731, this
Court allowed as damages for breach of contract for sale of
land by the vendor all sums paid in plus appreciation in value
of the premises, an element not present in this case und.er the
jury verdict. See also 55 A.J. 948, Vend or and Purchaser, § 555,
Annotations; 48 ALR 12, 68 ALR 137.
Nor does this case come within the rule of Federal Land
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Bank of Berkeley v. Sorenson et al., ( 1942) 101 Utah 305,
121 Pac. 2d 398. In this case appellants pleaded substantial
compliance and waiver of strict performance. The reccrd shows
that from June, 1950, to March, 1952, payments had not been
made in strict compliance .with the second lease agreement
(Ds' Exs. 1, 2, 6). Then, March 5, 1952, appellants were given
a notice that the contract was terminated, and their tender of
sums due to date was refused. Then, before the second notice
of August 15, 1952, appellants had obtained a commitment
to re-finance and pay off the entire obligation to respondents,
but respondents effectively blocked this through claiming the
amount due as $9,600.00 (Swan's Deposition 16-19, Jacobson's Deposition 26-27). The trial court gave no weight whatsoever· to these matters.
Certainly, on the facts of this case, respondents are entitled to a reasonable rental for the period of occupancy by
the appellants. To hold otherwise would result in an unjust
enrichment of appellants.
We respectfully submit, however, that appellants are entitled to judgment for all sums paid in excess of this amount.
A reasonable rental, $85.00 per month, from June 27, 1947,
to March 27, 1953\, would total $5,865.00. The jury determined
that appellants had paid a total of $8,687.41. This leaves as
a penalty the sum of $2,822.41. We further submit t~at appel-·
lants are entitled to a judgment for the costs of defending this
action, including a reasonable attorney's fee. All three contracts
provided for a reasonable attorney's fee for enforcing them.
Appellants have certainly attempted to enforce these agree33
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tnents, ·but have been prevented from so doing by the wrongful conduct of respondents. Appellants, moreover, are entitled
to interest on the amount thus recoverable. 55 A.J. 953, Vendor
and Purchaser, § 559.
W <: ask this Court to determine that Appellants, under all
three contracts, were purchasers of the premises in question,
that the forfeiture provisions in those contracts results in a
penalty, and therefore are not enforceable, and to remand this
case for the purpose of determining whether a tender of sums
due was made by appellants on March 5, 1952, and for the
purpose of determining the amount of appellants' damages for
'" rongful termination of the contract.

Respectfully submitted,

RAYH. IVIE
ALLEN B. SORENSEN

Attorneys For Appellants
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